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Abstract
Do the number of members, the level of democracy, and the level of
institutionalization contribute to the creation and use of a juridical organ in IGOs? This
study utilizes 495 IGOs in order to answer this question and examine which of these three
elements, or all of them, are relevant to the creation and use of any type of juridical
mechanism in an IGO. For each of these characteristics five dependent variables were
tested. Empirical results indicate that neither the level of democracy nor the number of
membership contributes to the creation and use of a juridical mechanism. In contrast,
only institutional structure was considered highly statistically significant. Unexpectedly,
the number of membership becomes statistically significant for the possession of formal
mediation in IGOs when institutional structure is absent.
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I. Intergovernmental Organizations and Juridical Organs
International organizations or intergovernmental organizations1 (IGOs) are often
third party actors between conflicting nation-states. The majority of these organizations
are created by states to foster a myriad of goals including the resolution of military,
environmental, and economic conflicts. The procedures used to mediate such disputes
vary in each organization. Additionally, the institutional structure for most IGOs varies
depending on the strength and the level of importance they have in the world and how
they collaborate and incorporate their ideas for the wellness of their community.
Most IGOs have been created to promote the development of cooperative
relationships between state members, some acting as mediators to either preserve a
stronger relationship among their members, or to solve conflicts more easily. In order to
provide a better conflict-resolution environment among the members of an IGO, most
IGOs have created their own dispute settlement mechanisms. These dispute mechanisms,
such as courts or other juridical structures, have helped IGOs to address their disputes
against other members and develop resolutions, statutes, and articles that help them to
resolve their conflicts.
However, until now the relationship of how other intergovernmental organizations
besides the UN and its juridical system relate and unify to create international law has
been unclear. Most scholars have only focused on the origins of international
organizations and their contribution to human rights, the United Nations often being the
center of attention in their studies. Furthermore, there are several studies that explain the
Despite existing differences between intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and
international organizations (IO) – IOs are not necessarily governmental controlled and
may be private – both terms are to be understood interchangeably for the scope of this
paper since government makes frequent use of various types international organizations.
1

1

connection between the UN and other juridical organs, leaving other IGOs outside of the
picture.
The significance of this thesis is twofold. On one hand it fills a void left in the
academic literature. Scholars tend to focus more on issues regarding how IGOs
contribute in promoting peace and cooperation with other countries rather than how and
in which types of juridical organs they address their disputes. While most studies focus
solely upon these outputs, this thesis focuses more upon the institutional structure of
juridical mechanisms within IGOs. On the other hand, this thesis also explores the
practical consequences of the creation and use of juridical organs in IGOs. One of the
most important issues deals with the number of members in IGOs. I suggest that a larger
number of members in an IGO will contribute more for the creation as well as for the use
of a juridical organ. Also, a larger membership within an IGO lends itself to the creation
of a juridical organ within that IGO for the purposes of organizing and contributing to the
creation of standards of international law.
It is very conspicuous to notice that scholars as well as policy makers have
analyzed both topics in a separate way, but placed major emphasis on the UN and its
institutional structure. ―However, what has not yet attracted much attention is the
relationship between international organizations and international dispute settlement
bodies‖ (Boisson de Chazournes, Romano, & Mackenzie 2002), given the absence of the
study of other IGOs, besides the UN, and juridical mechanism, I will investigate this
highly complex relationship and provide an answer to the following questions: What
types of IGO’s are more likely to have a juridical mechanism? What are some of the
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factors that contribute to an IGO for the creation of their own juridical mechanisms? And
once they have it, how many of those IGOs have made use of their juridical mechanism?
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) are often called upon by states to
intervene when a conflict arises between states. They are also central in the creation of
international law and juridical courts. One example of this is the United Nations (UN),
which has developed several institutions in order to serve different countries around the
world in diverse areas such as in the protection of human and women rights, children’s
education, economic development between states, and many others areas. Besides that,
the UN has its own juridical organ, which is known as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), in order to provide a court for conflict-resolution not only for the UN, but also for
other intergovernmental organizations.
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the interplay between IGOs and juridical
organs. Of particular interest is the idea of how IGOs create their own juridical
mechanisms. According to the book International Organizations and International
Dispute Settlement, ―in the majority of the cases, the organ representing the organization
before a dispute settlement body and the dispute settlement body itself are part of the
same organization‖ (Boisson de Chazournes, Romano, & Mackenzie 2002). This
statement supports my argument, which states that: not only states but also IGOs
constitute important bodies as recognized judicial courts and contribute to the formation
of international law. Additionally, I also explore whether or not instituted juridical organs
are utilized, or if they are only a façade, for there are few investigations that illustrate the
relationship between IGOs and dispute settlement bodies.
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Although the body of sound empirical research on IGOs and juridical mechanisms
is expanding, many features of these IGOs have not yet been completely measured and it
has not been clarified how these institutions help to create international law. Bearing this
in mind, my thesis begins by explaining why some IGOs have formed their juridical
organs, especially focusing on the role they play among their members and what juridical
organs they are most likely to use in order to solve their disputes. I examine whether their
level of democracy, the number of members and their level of institutional structure
contributes to the creation and use of a juridical mechanism in an IGO.
As already stated, the creation and importance of IGOs were growing markedly
among countries, but decreased in pace within the last 10 years (Pevehouse, Nordstrom,
& Warnke 2003). However, it is hard to assess the effectiveness of their performance in
the judiciary and, therefore, to asses if IGOs use it extensively. Besides the European
Communities (Boisson de Chazournes, Romano, & Mackenzie 2002), it is not very
common to see IGOs acting against other IGOs or states in juridical settlements. In an
attempt to determine whether the existence of a juridical mechanism in all or in some of
these IGOs is relevant or not, the assessment of the efficacy of their juridical performance
is required first.
Additionally, this investigation tries to attempt to determine if the juridical organ is
a decisive factor in the structure of IGOs, how it is constructed, and if it contributes to the
development of international law. Furthermore, with all the collected data, I expect to
conclude that a greater number of members will be a determinant factor in the creation
and use of a juridical mechanism in order to solve their disputes. Finally, I assume that
those IGOs with a higher degree of democracy within its members will use a juridical
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mechanism more often than those institutions that are not built upon democratic
principles.
Organization of the thesis
As previously stated, there is a need to portray the relationship between IGOs and
juridical organs. In order to accomplish the main goal of this thesis, the information
gathered for this study is based on theoretical as well as empirically proven information
of previous studies. Another aspect of the information gathered for this study is based on
quantitative analysis. A thorough description of these data will be provided in the
respective chapters. The following paragraphs give a brief description of the content of
each of the chapters of this study.
Chapter 2 explains the literature review concerning the history of
intergovernmental organizations and their relationship with juridical organs. It also
analyzes previous studies that relate to this field of research, including the number of
memberships in IGOs as well as the participation of democracy and international
structures in IGOs. Additionally, it also explains the different concepts and definitions
that are used for the purpose of this study, such as juridical organ and intergovernmental
organizations terms. It is also important to point out that the word “state” in this thesis
will refer to countries. This chapter also discusses the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as examples of those IGOs that have
created and used a juridical organ besides the United Nations (UN) and the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). Furthermore, at the end of this chapter the hypotheses for this
study will be presented along with a deeper discussion of how they will be analyzed and
tested with the aid of the collected data.
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Chapter 3 consists of a quantitative research design based on data sets such as
Polity98, the ―IGO Attributes‖ data set as compiled by Charles Boehmer (2009),
International Governmental Organization (IGO) Data (v2.1) by Jon Pevehouse and Tim
Nordstrom, and an additional data set extracted from Boehmer and Nordstrom (2008).
All these data sets provide collected information regarding the number of members in an
IGO, their average level of democracy, their level of institutional structure and their
relationship with juridical mechanisms to provide evidence for the following hypotheses:
a) The greater the number of states affiliated with an IGO, the more likely they will
contribute to the creation of a juridical organ b) The greater the number of states
affiliated with an IGO, the more likely it is that IGO will have used its juridical organ;
along with the rest of the hypotheses mentioned at the end of the chapter. The data
employed to test the statements previously mentioned consist of a thorough description of
the dependent and independent variables as well as the use of cross-tabs, and logistic
regressions and their respective explanation. These two different types of methods
combined will test if the number of members, the level of democracy and institutional
structure are determinant factors for the creation as well as for the use of a juridical
mechanism in an IGO. The next is then to examine whether this will eventually lead to a
democratic environment between their members through the use of mediation or other
types of conflict-resolution mechanisms.
Chapter 4 presents the analysis of the information accumulated by the previous
chapter. In other words, it explains the different quantitative tests applied and tables
given in order to test if intergovernmental organizations really help in the creation of a
juridical mechanism and its use. Additionally, it elucidates the results that the data will
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provide and explain the relationship between the different variables as well as their
significance for the creation of a juridical organ and which variables are more likely to
create it. In other words, the results obtained will enable us to test if the hypotheses
concluded in chapter 2 were correct or erroneous depending on what the results will tell
us. Lastly, it concludes with the results of the study as an overall synopsis and explores if
there were any other ways to modify the data gathered as well as any other unexpected
outcomes that would suggest modifications in the overall design of the study.
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II. IGOs and Juridical Organs: Their Relationship and Proliferation
There has been a constant growth in the number of IGOs as well as an expansion
of international law. Unfortunately, the lack of studies generally analyzing whether and
how, juridical mechanisms within IGOs work to help in the implementation of new
international law is very obvious. Instead, scholars often focus on the most powerful and
recognized international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the
European Union (EU) and often exclude other IGOs. We hence lack knowledge more
generally on other IGOs and their juridical organs.
This chapter describes the concepts as well as previous studies that talk about the
relationship between intergovernmental organizations and juridical mechanisms. There is
a myriad of literature that explains IGOs and their involvement in different international
issues, ranging from human rights to environmental as well as political-level treaties and
disputes. However, the lack of studies analyzing IGOs and their relationship with
juridical mechanisms is very conspicuous. This is one of the reasons for my describing
the IGOs’ structure as well as the juridical organ of the organizations in the present
chapter. Thus, I will be able to test whether there is a certain relationship between both
terms. Furthermore, this chapter will provide examples of institutions that have made use
of their juridical organs, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World
Health Organization (WHO). Finally, the hypotheses will be analyzed at the end of this
chapter.
IGOs and Their Proliferation
Nowadays, IGOs often play essential roles in the negotiation of agreements
between states by speeding up solutions. For that reason, IGOs have become
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omnipresent in international relations (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, & Warnke 2003),
obtaining prestigious international positions in the resolution of different global issues.
Additionally, IGOs play different roles for different states; some of them are created to
establish financial relationships, other institutions fight for the preservation of human
rights, while other IGOs are created to settle disputes among countries. Some scholars
like Wallace and Singer (1970), Russett and Oneal (2001), and Pevehouse, Nordstrom
and Warnke (2003) even consider some IGOs as ―emanations‖ because they re-emerge or
simply replace other institutions. In order to have a better conflict-resolution scenario,
some of these international institutions have created their own dispute settlement
mechanisms, some of which operate as courts.
As it was mentioned in chapter one, the main purpose of this study is to analyze
IGOs and their juridical mechanisms. In order to have a better understanding of the
content of this study, we must understand the terms used when referring to international
organizations and juridical mechanisms. Most of the sources found refer to the definition
of IGOs as ―an institutionalized arrangement among members of the international system
to solve tasks which have evolved from systemic conditions‖ (Hanrieder, 1966, p. 2).
Similarly, there exist several definitions to describe an intergovernmental
organization. However, the definition that I have selected for the purpose of this thesis is
the one given by Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke (2003), which states that: ―in order
to be considered an international organization, this institution would have at least 3
nation-states as their members, is a formal entity and possesses a permanent secretariat or
other indication of institutionalization such as headquarters and/or permanent staff.‖ This
is the definition of IGOs that will be employed for the purpose of this study.
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As it has been mentioned earlier, another important part of my thesis is the
juridical body of an IGO. After looking at several definitions, I faced the difficulty of
having to select one specific definition that would enable me to identify juridical organs.
The most common dictionary definition of judiciary is: ―the system of law courts that
administer justice and constitute the judicial branch of government.‖ Looking at other
meanings I was able to find that ―the judicial system is regarded primarily as a service
provided by the government…with the workaday function of resolving the [formally and
informally] disputes that arise in the ordinary course of social and economic life. The
Courts in such societies are, of course, essential organs‖ (Chayes, 1988 p. 1028).
Since none of these definitions can singularly help me for the elaboration of this
project, I came up with the following definition according to which the term
intergovernmental juridical mechanism would be described as follows: all those formal
organs that assist intergovernmental and international organizations to resolve their
conflicts and disputes through rulings, mediation, and arbitration. Some examples of
these formal organs are the International Court of Justice (ICJ), regional and specialized
courts, the international arbitration and domestic courts. Also some IGOs have opted for
mediation mandate whenever a conflict arises between their members or other IGOs. It is
important to mention these three types of conflict-resolution mechanisms because some
of the intergovernmental organizations will have a judicial court or council body in which
they solve their disputes and sometimes create international law through some or all of
these three types of solutions.
The dispute settlement structure of an organization may play a very important role
in the stability between the members of an organization. It is through juridical organs
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that some IGOs are able to take, discuss, and solve their disputes among the members of
the same organization as well as with other states. Having a juridical organ within their
organization assists the member states to obtain bargains or agreements that can be of
benefit to members of that IGO. Nonetheless, IGOs have the ability to request and
influence advisory opinions whenever they think their opinion is necessary and the
specific courts allow them to do so. It is through advisory opinions that IGOs may
influence ―the development and outcome of the dispute‖ (Dominicé, 2002, p.98).
The ICJ, under the UN, has allowed advisory opinions since 1936 and they have
played an important role in the decision-making process of specialized agencies such as
the World Health Organization and UNESCO (Boisson de Chazournes, 2002). IGOs,
contrary to states, are the only agents allowed to request advisory opinions at the ICJ.
The role of juridical mechanisms in an organization in some cases is to assist with legal
advice to the parties in dispute and make sure that those rules imposed by the final
decision of the court are effective and respected by both parties. Although the study of
IGOs and juridical organs has not captured the attention of many scholars, it is important
to analyze the connection between IGOs and juridical mechanisms. In the next sections, I
will take a look at how the inclusion of juridical mechanisms into IGOs has taken place
and how these mechanisms have since evolved. I will start with the ICJ as an example of
how it has been used as a dispute settlement mechanism between IGOs.
The ICJ and Its Performance in IGOs
According to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), intergovernmental
organizations may request advisory opinions but cannot bring cases to the Court, which
means that they can only participate in those cases where the states involved request the
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institution’s opinion. Although this procedure is available to certain public international
organizations, other non-listed organizations can also request it and it is up to the ICJ
whether to accept or decline the request. In addition to this, the ICJ ―has played an
important role in juridical determination of a number of disputes between states and in
delivering advisory opinions that clarify and contribute to the growth of international
law‖ (Gibson, 1991, p.117). There are several cases where IGOs have requested advisory
opinions from the ICJ. The first institution to do so since the creation of the court was
the World Health Organization (WHO), which in 1980 requested an advisory opinion
concerning the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and
Egypt (ICJ, Reports, 1980).
The Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt consisted of the
decision on whether or not the regional office of the WHO should be relocated from
Egypt to another Arab country. The controversy arose when the WHO was asking the
ICJ for the first time for an advisory opinion on whether or not the organization would be
violating the agreement between the country and the organization in case of relocation
and whether or not the Agreement of 25 March 1951 would be terminated at the time of
relocation. After considering the opinions of other states with various international
organizations and the relationship and history of the WHO with Egypt, the Court
concluded that, ―the contractual legal regime gave rise to mutual obligations of cooperation and good offices‖(Amr, 2003), and it depended on the specific kind of
modalities the relocation might affect both the WHO and Egypt.
Not all international juridical bodies have the authority to provide advisory
opinions. In order to do so, they must prove that they are capable of handling cases in
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their courts. For example, advisory opinions can be rendered by the ICJ but not by the
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism or by any other international criminal tribunals
because such power would be considered a ―distraction from the true function of a
criminal court of law‖ (Romano, 2002). Furthermore, the capacity to request for advisory
opinions is more likely given to IGOs and not to individual states or groups of states
(Romano, 2002); however, IGOs cannot appear before ICJ in contentious cases. As we
see, the WHO case is an example of how IGOs have the power to request advisory
opinions and take them to international courts.
Additionally, even though disputes among international organizations are quite
rare, they can be submitted to arbitral tribunals whenever it is necessary (Romano, 2002).
This can be illustrated by the Contadora process, which involved disputes between the
OAS and the UN Secretary-General and produced normative resolutions in both
organizations (Alvarez, 2005). However, there are also restrictions on the sort of cases
IGOs can discuss or ask for advisory opinions in international courts such as the ICJ. For
example, IGOs are not allowed to take cases regarding human rights.
An exception to this situation is the African Court of Human and People’s Rights
(ACHPR), part of the African Union (AU), which allows their members and other
―African intergovernmental organizations,‖ and other IGOs where African countries are
members to take cases that deal with human rights (Romano, 2002). On the other hand,
if an individual or group believe their human rights established in the American
Convention on Human Rights have been violated and the individual or group are legally
recognized by one or more member states of the Organization of American States (OAS),
they can make a petition to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in order to
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investigate the complaint. If the commission proves that there has been a violation
against the individual or group, a case can be submitted to the court (Romano, 2002).
IGOs in the Dispute Settlement Arena
The number of international organizations has proliferated greatly over the last 3
decades; as of today, there are hundreds of international organizations around the world,
each with different tasks to perform. As of 2004, at least 238 international organizations
were working on global issues (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). It has proven difficult to
estimate the increase in IGOs because many other organizations are regional or have a
more limited focus. Moreover, the IGOs population varies due to definition used of IGO
and their birth and death rates. The current number ranges from 270 to more than a
thousand (―Intergovernmental Organizations,‖ 2008) depending on the definition
established for IGOs. Furthermore, there is a diversity of theories that try to explain why
IGOs have been created and how they perform in order to help solve problems.
According to Gerard J. Magone (1954), international organizations existed before
Napoleonic times, but most of these fall outside most modern definitions of IGOs.
According to Magone, the Roman Empire was one of the first inspirations for the
creation of international organizations. These different institutions have helped to
prevent and solve issues between different countries. International organizations have
helped in a variety of ways such as in the creation of laws that protect human rights as
well as the fight for endangered animals.
There was a proliferation in the members of international organizations during the
last few decades of the 20th century. During the late 1940s, when the U.S. stood as the
world hegemon, it created several international institutions for three main reasons: 1)
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maintaining peace and security, 2) maintaining a stable international economic market,
and 3) supporting democracies and protecting human rights. Two important
organizations came into existence after the occurrence of the two world wars of the
twentieth century. They are The League of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations in
1942, whose most important mission was to preserve peace among countries. However,
many regional organizations arose with some purpose, including the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), today renamed African Union (AFU), Organizations of American
States (OAS), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and others.
As it was previously stated, after two great wars, the international community saw
the opportunity to come together in order to solve rising disputes through diplomatic
channels instead of war. One example of this situation is presented to us in today’s
current world affairs. Having China, Russia, U.S., France, United Kingdom, Pakistan,
India and possibly Israel being the only nation-states to publicly possess nuclear weapons
has inclined the less powerful states such as Iran and North Korea to pursue nuclear
deterrents. It is then, in situations like this, that states try to prevent military conflicts by
readdressing IGOs because their main function is to provide order and peace between
nations and to serve as an authority on its own for advancing shared security and wellbeing (Gibson, 1991).
According to Michael Barnett and Martha Finnermore (2004), international
organizations are treated as ―structures of rules, principles, norms, and decision-making
procedures through which others, usually states, act‖ (p.2). In other words, IGOs are
structured to extend good and bad norms. Second, IGOs help states to cooperate in any
approach to resolve disputes and improve relationships with other member states. Finally,
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IGOs help to resolve disputes that might affect their future agreements with other states
as well as to facilitate their relationship and respect their own rules. Some
intergovernmental organizations are seen as reliable institutions that help to make and
affect authoritative decisions on issues among two or more nations, giving them ―more
far-reaching powers of independent action and decision‖ (Akehurst, 1967, p.3) in every
aspect of international relations.
Although many scholars assumed that IGOs are purposively created by states
(Barnett and Finnemore, 2004), international organizations also face problems after and
during their creation because IGOs often perform or behave differently than had been
intended by state members. One such problem is collective action. According to Mancur
Olson (1994), collective action is when all the members in a group have the same
interests and concerns and they work as a team to achieve them. He argues that the
greatest concern within these institutions is that the majority will take advantage of the
minority by free riding. Furthermore, Olson points out that an organization with a large
number of members will have more difficulty achieving its goals than a smaller number
of members. This is due to the lack of free riding a smaller number of members will have
in order to accomplish their goals and reach a faster agreement among themselves. In
order to concur in their agreements ―most of the large economic organizations in the
United States have had to develop special institutions to solve the membership problem
posed by the large scale of their objectives‖ (Olson, 1994, p.65). Once again, he
reemphasizes that larger groups are, due to the number of members, less efficient and less
organized at the time of making decisions than smaller groups.
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Contradictory to his point, collective action can also be seen as an asset at the
same time. Collective action also helps with the dissemination of more institutions into
the same institutions, the UN being a current example of this situation. Furthermore, in
order to avoid collective action problems between the members of an organization, the
members of an IGO have a tendency to become more democratic. It has been proven that
if the members of an IGO tend to be more democratic, there will be a higher probability
for them to enhance the conditions enforced upon them by other members (Pevehouse,
2005). As a result, IGOs will be more likely to cooperate, trade and maintain stable
relationships with other democracies and the probabilities to have a collective action
problem will decrease.
The Success of the Establishment of a Juridical Organ in an IGO
As we can remark, IGOs may have a very influential role in helping states to
solve their disputes, but unfortunately there is not a clear idea of how IGOs influence
conflict-resolution processes through the use of juridical organs. This is one reason why
in this study we also analyze how these IGOs create their own juridical mechanisms in
order to provide a peaceful environment between the members of their own organizations
as well as with other states involved. In order for an IGO to be more effective and have
higher participation in the making of important decisions, some IGOs have created their
own juridical structure to solve disputes between their members or other states involved
in a specific conflict. As Mangone puts it; ―the most significant contribution of Rome for
the future of International Organizations was the Court for foreigners‖ (Mangone, 1954,
p.15). This court’s mission was to administer law in cases involving non-Roman citizens
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at that time. Since that time, the structure and the heart of the discussion have determined
the effect that IGOs have on disputes.
Many dispute settlements have emerged since the Court for foreigners. For
example, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1922; at the end of
WWII, the ICJ was created, followed by the European Court of Justice in 1951 and the
European Court of Human Rights being part of the European Union (EU) in 1952, and
the dispute settlement forums of the WTO, to name a few. Today, the most commonly
used international court is the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where states through
the help of IGOs and IGOs themselves are allowed to request advisory opinions.
Additionally, the UN has also established special tribunals for war crimes, such as in
Rwanda, Cambodia, and Sudan.
As it mentioned earlier, another important aspect of international organizations is
that some of them have created a juridical mechanism inside their own organization.
According to Steve Charnovitz in his article, ―Judicial Independence in the World Trade
Organization‖, some elements of judicial review emerged as early as 1919 within
international organizations starting with the constitution of the International Labour
Organization (ILO) in that year (Charnovitz, 2002). After this judicial procedure began,
the Abolition Convention of 1927 took place, attempting to provide advisory opinion
given by a technical body in the League of Nations and eventually to use arbitration if it
was necessary. However, unfortunately this attempt was unsuccessful (Charnovitz, 2002).
Nonetheless, this was not the only effort made by IGOs, for after this attempt many other
organizations created juridical mechanisms.
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These mechanisms or courts have mainly been created with the purpose of
hearing cases only when submitted by parties in dispute (Blaisdell, 1966). The United
Nations (UN) is a clear example of this recognition implemented not only by the states,
but also by the International Court of Justice. The ICJ is the principal juridical organ of
the UN. According to the UN official website, one of the ICJ’s roles inside the UN is to
solve legal disputes submitted by the states and give advisory legal opinions authorized
by the UN organs and specialized agencies. Nevertheless, many other IGOs contain
these mechanisms.
On the other hand, states are allowed to request an advisory opinion through other
IGOs such as ILO, UN, OAS, etc. This is one of the reasons why some of these
international organizations create their own juridical organs. In special situations, IGOs
possess the authority and the right of action when a quarrel between members occurs.
They often apply this right in ―settlement of disputes or in the field of administration‖
(Hill, 1952). This is the case with the World Trade Organization (WTO), which after
several decades was able to elaborate and put in practice the Dispute Settlement
Understanding as part of the WTO charter (Croley & Jackson, 2003).
The World Trade Organization is an example of how an IGO has the power to
create its own juridical mechanisms in order to provide ―only‖ legal assistance to the
members of its organization and allows panels to consult with other IGOs under Article
13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (Romano, 2002). One of the most
controversial cases held by the WTO took place in 1998, which involved the European
Union (EU) and the complaint made by the US to the WTO on whether or not the
bananas tariff imposed by the EU was too high. It is worth mentioning here, that this
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case is one of the most important at the level of international dispute settlement
mechanisms because the EU had to submit itself under the WTO juridical mechanism
leaving aside the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The role that the WTO played in this
case was crucial because the extent of retaliation constantly done by the US against the
EU, of continually accusing it of violating the WTO rules, was this severe that the case
was opened again in 2001.
As it is reflected in these two examples, one of the functions of IGOs is to
cooperate in the creation of new mechanisms that can help to generate safety, peaceful
measures and better working-climate between countries. Additionally, scholars such as
Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) have argued that the impact that IGOs have on
dispute behavior can be due to three factors, namely ―mandate, member cohesion, and
institutional structure‖ (p.7). These statements are supported by the liberal institutional
theory, which argues that IGOs are in favor of diplomatic and peaceful conflict resolution
and try to avoid disagreements or conflictive situations among the members of the
organization (Boehmer, Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004). Nonetheless, IGOs while solving
disputes are often seen by constructivists, functionalists and liberal institutionalists as ―a
central component of world order‖ (Boehmer, Gartzke, & Nordstrom, 2004).

IGOs, Democracy, Membership and Institutional Structure: A Complex
Linkage
As we have discussed before, not only membership but also democracy is seen as
a way to maintain a stable relationship among the members of the same organization as
well as with other organizations. This is one of the reasons why democracy, besides the
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number of members, constitutes an important part of IGOs in this study. There are
countless studies in the international relations field that argue that state members of an
IGO work in close liaison with other member countries of the same organization in order
to preserve their benefits and avoid conflicts between them.
Democracy plays a very important role among the members of an organization
because through democracy state members are more willing to cooperate, ally, and trade
between them in order to obtain more benefits (Pevehouse, 2005). However, sometimes
democracy is also enforced between the members of an IGO through the use of sanctions
and even with membership suspension if the majority of the members agree with the
terms. Hence, the level of democracy in an IGO can be seen as one of the reasons why
some states prefer to join some IGOs rather than other IGOs.
If there is democracy within the members of an IGO, it is more likely that other
democratic states will join the same organization. Joining an IGO that is recognized for
its level of democracy increases the possibilities to obtain more benefits and facilitate
agreements among state members of the same organization. Scholarly work reveals that
there is an obvious connection between membership and democratization. Academics
such as Shanks, Jacobson and Kaplan (1996) and Boehmer and Nordstrom (2008) explain
that democracies are more likely to join IGOs than autocracies. Additionally, other
factors include that if a state has been independent, economically developed and
democratic, it will tend to join IGOs (Jacobson, Reisenger, & Mathers, 1986).
The existence of democracy in an IGO sometimes is due to a well-formed
institutional structure in an IGO. Democracy and membership constitute an essential part
in the creation of a stronger institutional structure. An institutional structure in an IGO
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has to obey to rules imposed on them by the members of an IGO. Another side of an
institutional structure is the juridical part. Sometimes there are juridical organs or
conflict resolution mechanisms where members of IGOs can bring forward their
complaint and a special authority that can follow the procedure such as a secretariat or a
council. Some of the procedures employed by IGOs in order to solve their disputes
among other members are resolved through the use of mediation or arbitration. It has
been argued that IGOs that have more institutional structure can help to solve different
problems involving collective action (Boehmer and Nordstrom, 2008).
Most of the literature above clearly shows that state democracy contributes to
obtain a higher number of members within an IGO. The effectiveness of socialization of
states in the most highly institutionalized IGOs is also a signal of elevation in the
membership of international organizations (Bearce and Bondella, 2007). Oneal and
Russet (2001) often state that countries that share the same membership in an IGO are
less likely to experience disputes. Pevehouse (2005) in his investigation has also
demonstrated that a change in membership can influence the variations of outcomes
towards democratization.
It is evident that democratization along with institutional structure, whether it is
through the help of sanctions, loss of membership, economical benefit, or other factors,
are major contributors for an IGO to augment their number of members. In other words,
institutional structure allows for IGO efficacy to enforce norms and rules. What it is still
not clear is whether or not democratization and membership along with institutional
structure really contribute to establish a juridical structure within IGOs. My contribution
is to show that a higher number of membership, democratization, and institutional
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structure or the three elements together have become factors in the creation and use of a
juridical organ.
The Hypotheses
The relationship and importance of a juridical mechanism or any kind of dispute
settlement with an IGO is fundamental for the collaboration of new treaties and a
peaceful environment between the member states of a certain organization and other
states as well. Very often, the ICJ has been the instrument used to settle disputes between
IGOs and their officials through the request of advisory opinions (Dominicé, 2002).
However, one question that has still remained unanswered is what are the factors that
contribute to the creation of a conflict resolution mechanism in an IGO? The power to
create a juridical mechanism and the influence and the authority that IGOs have in the
decisions taken by that specific juridical organ can be due to several factors. Three of
these factors are the number of member states in an IGO, the level of democracy between
its members, and the institutional structure of an IGO. These three components might
lead to the necessity of a juridical organ for their organization, in order to have a fastest
conflict-resolution environment.
As it was previously stated, we need to recognize that ―the most highly
institutionalized organization possesses mechanisms of mediation, arbitration, or
adjudication aimed at conflict resolution and the enforcement of organizational
decisions‖ (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, 2004). These mechanisms are created to
solve disputes and enforce and maintain democratic relationship among the members of
an IGO. What the study needs to test is whether or not the number of members along
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with the level of democracy and the level of institutional structure in IGOs contributes to
create and make use of these kinds of juridical mechanisms.
Therefore, based on these propositions, I present six hypotheses that attempt to
test if there is a connection between the number of state members, democracy,
institutional structure and the creation and use of a juridical organ in an IGO. First, I
argue that a higher number of state memberships in an organization lead to a greater
possibility for the creation of a juridical mechanism in the IGO. This might occur
because an IGO with fewer members may possibly serve more easily as forums for
informal bargaining between states, whereas higher number of members may necessitate
more formal juridical mechanisms or organs to solve their disputes.
H1.

The greater the number of state members in an IGO, the more likely the
IGO will contain a juridical organ.

In view of the fact that IGOs are seen as the scenarios through which decisionmaking, conflict-resolution and the establishment of norms takes place, some IGOs
possess a juridical structure. Therefore, if hypothesis one is proven right, then the number
of memberships in an IGO tends to elevate the possibility to create a juridical
mechanism. For that reason, my second hypothesis suggests that membership in an
organization tends not only to lead to the creation of juridical structure, but also to the
subsequent use thereof, when disputes arise among their member states.
H2.

The greater the number of states affiliated with an IGO, the more likely it
is that IGO will have used its juridical organ.

Several studies such as those made by Wallace and Singer (1970), Russet and
Oneal (2001), Pevehouse (2005) and the most recent one brought forward by Boehmer
and Nordstrom (2008), interconnect the relationship among democracy and IGOs and
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how these organizations try to conserve peaceful relations between their country
members. These studies suggest that membership and democracy between the members
of an IGO are two factors that contribute to the improvement of treaties and benefits of
the member states. Additionally, these scholars argue that the institutional structure of an
IGO may be an essential factor to promote peace among the members of these
institutions. Based on these assumptions, I will analyze if democracy as well as
institutional structure of an IGO can be considered as an influence to the creation and use
of a juridical mechanism in an IGO. Therefore, the following hypotheses will be tested:
H3.

The more democratic the members of an IGO, the more likely it is the
IGO will possess a juridical organ.

H4.

The more democratic the members of an IGO, the more likely it is the IGO
will have used its juridical organ.

H5.

The higher the level of institutional structure in an IGO, the more likely it
is the IGO will have a juridical organ.

H6.

The higher the level of institutional structure in an IGO, the more likely it
is the IGO will use a juridical organ.

The hypotheses above portrayed some of the possible factors that might
contribute to the creation of a juridical mechanism inside of an IGO. Two of the
hypotheses suggest that the number of members affiliated with an IGO might determine
the necessity and degree of elaboration of a juridical mechanism in which their members
will be able to solve their disputes with other members of that IGO. In other words, what
these hypotheses reflect is that a greater number of member states will be more likely to
create and make use of the dispute settlement of the IGO of which they are members
rather than a small number of members.
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The rest of the hypotheses suggest that a high level of democracy that each
member state has, might encourage other members of the same organization to create
their own juridical structure. In other words, democracy will be seen as a factor of
enforcement for the members of an organization to create and use a juridical mechanism
in order to solve their conflicts and respect the rules imposed on by their own system. In
order for these IGOs to respect and follow the rules imposed by their own juridical
system, it is essential for these institutions to have a compelling institutional structure.
Therefore, not only a high number of memberships and a high level of democracy will be
seen as two possible factors for the creation and use of an IGO, but also a high level of
institutional structure of an IGO. However, the next chapter will discuss more intensively
how these variables will be measured and it will provide a deeper discussion of the type
of data that will be used in order to test these hypotheses.
Once again, the field of study on the judiciary within IGOs is very limited and has
not attracted too much the attention of scholars. Heretofore, many studies provide only a
glimpse of the role and the relationship of IGOs and juridical mechanisms by explaining
them in a separate way and not looking at them as a united body. The particular interest
in this study is to provide an idea of the participation that IGOs have in juridical
mechanisms as well as to provide evidence that IGOs themselves can have the power and
the capacity to create a juridical structure and that that dispute settlement body might lead
to the elaboration of international laws for the benefit of the organization and the member
states. The next chapter discusses the research design and data used to test these
hypotheses.
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III. Research Design
The previous chapter described the literature review and the theoretical
propositions linking IGOs and juridical organs. Chapter 3 now describes the methods and
data I used in order to test the hypotheses in chapter 2. In this chapter, I explain the
quantitative tests employed. I also provide a thorough description of the data and
variables used to test the hypotheses. The statistical analysis consists of a discussion of
frequency statistics and logistic regression analyses. The results produced by these
statistical methods are intended to test whether the independent variables are determinant
factors for the creation, as well as the use of, a juridical mechanism in an IGO.
Describing the Methods
In this study, I argue that three of the factors that contribute to the creation and use
of a juridical mechanism are the number of memberships, the level of democracy, and the
level of institutionalization of an IGO. As I have stated in the previous chapter, there are
studies that limit their attention to IGOs such as the United Nations (UN) or the European
Union (EU). It is important to mention that in this thesis the information gathered is
focused not only on these two organizations but also on all those organizations that have
a juridical mechanism and that falls into the definition of IGOs given earlier.
The type of evidence that has been collected in order to test the hypotheses
presented in chapter 2 consists of gathering data on the number of members of IGOs, the
level of democracy, and institutionalization of each IGO from the year 1815 to the year
2000. The IGO data come from the International Governmental Organization (IGO) Data
(v2.1) set by Jon Pevehouse and Tim Nordstrom. The unit of analysis in this data set is
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based on a cross-section of the IGOs. The data were collapsed down into cross-sectional
data from the IGO-year data format.
Dependent variables
I will examine five dependent variables in order to test the presence of a juridical
mechanism in an IGO and the use of a juridical mechanism to settle disputes. The period
of time for each of the variables was coded at any point in its history where any of these
four mechanisms took place. A further set of data, modified and combined with data from
the ―IGO Attribute‖ data set by Dr. Boehmer (2009), has been used to determine the
IGOs that both have a juridical mechanism such as a court or other formal means of
mediation/arbitration as well as having made use of it will be subject to thorough
analysis. The first dependent variable points out the number of all those IGOs that
possess some form of a court and will be identified as Judiciary. The second variable is
called Mediation and refers to all those IGOs that have mandate for formal mediation.
Both of these variables are classified as nominal and they equal 1 when any of these
mechanisms are in IGOs and 0 otherwise.
The third variable, Juridical, reports the presence or the absence of a juridical
mechanism in an IGO. This is also a nominal variable that equals 1 when an IGO has a
court or formal mediation mechanism and 0 if both of these mechanisms are absent in an
IGO. These data set show that the majority of IGOs analyzed do not have a formal or
official juridical mechanism. In other words, not having a juridical mechanism in the
structure of an IGO where to solve their disputes might prove less relevant to issues of
institutionalization and international law among IGOs member states.
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The fourth dependent variable is called Used; it indicates which IGOs have
formally made use of their dispute settlement structures. This variable also equals 1 if
used and 0 otherwise. The information collected for this variable has also been taken
from the IGO Attribute data set (Boehmer, 2009) and my own data collection.
Additionally, this data set will also help to measure the levels of democracy and
institutionalization in each IGO observed and determines if democracy and
institutionalization are significant factors to the use and elaboration of a juridical organ.
Finally, an additional dependent variable has been added in the study. The fifth
dependent variable is called Institutional Structure (Inst_igo) which examines how the
number of members and the level of democracy in an IGO affect the IGO institutional
structure level.
Independent Variables
The first independent variable is Avg-Dem, which measures the average level of
democracy of each IGO’s members over the life of the IGO. The first step to create this
variable was to merge each country from the Polity98 data set into the COW 2.1a state
IGO membership data set. For each year of each IGO, the democracy scores for the
members were averaged and then collapsed into a single mean statistic per IGO. This
allows for the inclusion of this variable in a cross-sectional study. Polity98 data set has
been very helpful in studies that have been intended to measure the level of democracy in
IGOs. The polity score consists of 0 to 10 autocracy score subtracted from its 0 to 10 for
democracy score, providing a combined score of -10 as the least democratic and +10 as
the most democratic. The autocracy and democracy score are based on a variety of
measures, including competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political
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participation, executive recruitment and the constraints on the chief executive (Gurr et al,
2009). Polity98 is also a source that is very reliable for and familiar to political science
scholars such as Mansfield (2000), Russet and Oneal (2001), Pevehouse (2005), and
others, who tried to investigate issues related to democracy, peace, war in international
organizations, and whose studies are based on quantitative research and focused on
international organizations.
The next independent variable is Membership. This variable measures the
average count of members in each IGO over its history. The construction of this variable
is similar to the democracy variable. The COW IGO 2.1a data was used to sum per year
the membership of each IGO. This data set was then collapsed into data based on the
mean value across all the years of an IGO’s existence. This transformation is essential
because it will help to convert the data into a cross-sectional format.
A third and last variable is called Inst_igo referring to the institutional structure of
an IGO. IGOs vary in their level of institutional structure; therefore a detail description
of this variable is given in Appendix 1. This variable is based on Boehmer et al. (2004)
that has been updated for a project by Gastzke, Nordstrom, Boehmer, and Hewitt (2009).
This variable is divided and identified on a four-point scale of institutionalization. The
first category is called no institutional structure as (0), the second category (1) as minimal
structure, which identifies if an IGO possesses a secretariat but there is a lack of
bureaucracy. The third category of this variable is identified as structured IGOs as (2),
when there are structures of assembly or bureaucracies to implement policies and
procedures. The last category is identified as (3) when it refers to interventionist IGOs.
Interventionist IGOs refers to all those conflict resolution organs and mechanisms,
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including the courts, formal mediation/arbitration, peacekeeping, defense pacts and the
ability to improve economic sanctions such embargoes and withholding loans. This
variable was also collapsed into a mean statistic for cross-sectional format. In addition to
this, Inst_igo will also be used at the end of the study as a dependent variable to measure
the effect that membership and democracy might cause over institutional structure.
Having explained the importance of the variables and the process that has been
used for their collection, the next chapter presents the statistical analysis. I will first
provide descriptive information for each of the dependent variables through the
interpretation of frequencies. Each of these frequencies will allow me to determine the
specific number of IGOs that possess any type of court, mediation or both. Eventually,
these tests will also help me to detect the number of IGOs that have made use of any type
of juridical mechanism or organ.
The use of logistic regression is required for the first four dependent variables used
in this study because they are measured as dichotomous and binary variables. This will
allow me to discern statistical significance of the hypothesized relationships. Finally, I
decided to use ordered probit regression to test how the number of membership and
democracy level of IGOs affect their level of institutionalization. This is necessary when
analyzing ordinal dependent variables. Overall, the methodology that will be applied in
this thesis will consists of the use frequencies and logistic regressions between the
variables in order to find out which variables are more statistically significant and may
cause either a positive or negative impact in the expected results.
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IV. Results
Chapter 4 explains the level of connection that exists between the independent
and dependent variables. I first present and discuss the empirical tests of the hypotheses
with a discussion of the descriptive statistics. In order to measure the effects of
membership, democracy and the institutional structure of IGOs on the creation and use of
a juridical mechanisms or organs, I utilized a combination of cross tabulations and
logistic regressions. Moreover, considering that institutional structure relates to juridical
organs, I examine how democracy and the number of members in an IGO predict
institutional structure by using an ordered probit test. I conclude the chapter by providing
a list identifying to those IGOs that possess and use a juridical mechanism.
In each of the first four tables I include Membership, Avg-Dem, and Inst_igo as
independent variables. I examined four dependent variables: 1) Judiciary, referring to all
those IGOs that possess some form of a court, 2) Mediation, concerning to IGOs that
have mandate for formal mediation, 3) Juridical, when referring to those IGOs that
possess a court and/or formal mediation, and 4) Used, measuring all those (juridical)
IGOs that have used its juridical mechanism or not, whether by court or formal
mediation. The next sections will explain the tables and results for each of the tests.
Frequencies and Cross-Tabulations
I first discuss the frequencies of the dependent variables. The Judiciary variable
determined that out of 295 IGOs only 23 IGOs possess some form of court. The next
variable called Mediation measures which IGOs possess a mandate for formal mediation.
Only 19 IGOs out of 294 have this type of conflict- resolution mechanism. Furthermore,
the results given by the Juridical variable were that only 27 IGOs out of 294 possess a
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court or a mechanism of formal mediation or both. Finally, the results also show that
there are 21 IGOs that have used their juridical mechanism, whether it is a court or
formal mediation. Therefore, I can conclude that juridical organs are uncommon across
IGOs, and not that many have been used.
Testing the Hypotheses
The following four tables include two logistic regression models per table. In the
first model, the Inst_igo variable has been dropped in order to observe if there is any
impact on the Membership and Avg-Dem variables when institutional structure is not
included in the model. In the second model, Inst_igo has been included in order to
observe any change in the previous results. Table 1 includes two logistic regression
models each for the impact that the Judiciary variable has on IGOs. In model 1-1, using
only Avg-Dem and membership, and in model 1-2, adding the institutional structure
variable, I was able to observe that there is no change in any of the results and only
Inst_igo appears to be statistically significant. Based on these results, H5 can be accepted
because Inst_igo can contribute to the possession of some form of court in IGOs.
Consequently, hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 can be rejected because neither the level of
democracy nor the numbers of memberships of an IGO contribute for the creation and
use of a judicial organ.
Estimates in table 2 are again obtained by using logistic regression, but with
Mediation as the dependent variable. Model 2-1 reports that by the exclusion of the
Inst_igo variable, the Membership variable becomes statistically significant. Model 2-2
reports that only Inst_igo is a predominant variable with a Z-value of 2.23. Therefore,
both models show that a higher number of members and a higher level of institutional
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structure in an IGO can contribute to the possession of formal mediation, except when
both variables are combined. As a result, H1 can be accepted if institutional structure is
excluded. Table 3 shows Juridical as the dependent variable for both models. The results
report that Membership and Avg-dem variables are not statistical significant in model 3-1
and that by adding Inst_igo in model 3-2 only Inst_igo becomes statistical significant. In
order for an IGO to possess a court or a formal mediation mandate or both, an IGO will
have a higher level of institutional structure. As a result, hypothesis 5 for this model can
also be accepted. Based on the results given by the two tables, hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 6
can be rejected.
Table 1 IGOs and Full Judiciary
Model 1-1
Judiciary

Coef.

Model 1-2
Std. Err.

Z

Judiciary

Avg-Dem
Membership

.0408375
.007831

.0492069 0.83 Avg-Dem
.005676 1.38 Membership
Inst_igo

Constant

-2.80791

.3337502 8.41

N
285
Prob>Chi2
.3379
Note: Test are Two-tailed. Standard Errors are robust.P<.05

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

.0242193
-.0002972
.514517

.0500243
.0068558
.2474642

0.48
-0.04
2.08

-3.07334

.3802216

-8.08

275
0.1065

Results on table 4 again are obtained by using logistic regression, but this time
using Used as the dependent variable. Model 4-1 and 4-2 show that there is no
statistically significant variable for each of the results. These results support neither of
my hypotheses stating the use of a juridical mechanism in an IGO, whether it is a court or
formal mediation. Consequently, hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 can be rejected because there is
not an elevated number of IGOs that have used a juridical mechanism. This might be due
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to the low number of observations used in the estimation. The number of observations
used in this model was 26 and 25 respectively; increasing the number of observations to
at least 40 could have given a better estimation. Overall, the results provided in each of
the tables show that democracy is not a determinant factor for the possession and use of a
juridical organ in an IGO.
Table 2 IGOs and Mediation Mandate
Model 2-1
Mediation

Coef.

Avg-Dem
Membership

Constant

Model 2-2
Std. Err.

-.029833
.0113571

-3.013294

Z

Mediation

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

.0540404 0.55 Avg-Dem
.0056182 2.02 Membership
Inst_igo

-.0489803
.0024047
.5949832

.0536143
.006783
.2671397

-.91
.35
2.23

.3395653 8.87

-3.296176

.3959327

-8.83

N
284
Prob>Chi2
.1396
Note: Test are Two-tailed. Standard Errors are robust. P<.05

274
.0359

Table 3 IGOs and the Possession of a Court, Mediation or both
Model 3-1
Juridical
Avg-Dem
Membership

Constant

Model 3-2

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

.0003172
.0070714

.0439878
.0053372

.01
1.32

-2.502286

.2873664

-8.71

Juridical
Avg-Dem
Membership
Inst_igo

N
284
Prob>Chi2
.4521
Note: Test are Two-tailed. Standard Errors are robust. P<.05
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Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

-.0164601
-.001004
.519074

.0446227
.0063895
.2306528

-.37
-.16
2.25

-2.759742

.3310692

-8.34

274
.1036

Table 4 IGOs and the Use of a Juridical Organ
Model 4-1
Used

Coef.

Model 4-2
Coef.

Std. Err.

.0859602 0.24 Avg-Dem
.0126363 0.35 Membership
Inst_igo
.6345216 1.62

-.0435107
-.0065265
1.047069
.2571358

.1056617
.0151968
.7256045
.7993829

N
26
Prob>Chi2
.9219
Note: Test are Two-tailed. Standard Errors are robust. P<.05

25
.4834

Avg-Dem
Membership

.0202431
.004431

Constant

1.027061

Std. Err.

Z

Used

Z
-.41
-.43
1.44
0.32

Additional Results
Table number 5 includes Inst_igo as the dependent variable and Membership and
Democracy as the independent variables. I decided to use the institutional structure of an
IGO as a dependent variable in order to test if the number of members and the level of
democracy can explain the institutional structure of an IGO. This is desirable because the
institutional structure level of an IGO can include courts and mediation. Table 5
illustrates that both independent variables become highly statistically significant when
having Inst_igo as the dependent variable. Additionally, it displays the results given by
the ordered probit regression test, which confirms that there is a statistically significant
relationship between Membership and Democracy in order for the creation of an
institutional structure in an IGO. Hence, I can assume that the higher the membership
and the level of democracy in an IGO, the higher the level of IGO institutional structure.
Consequently, these results also demonstrate that Membership and Democracy are part of
the institutional structure of an IGO making both variables more relevant. As a
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conclusion, if Inst_igo had originally been used as a dependent variable, I could have
hypothetically stated that: the higher the level of democracy and membership in an IGO,
the more likely the IGO will have an institutional structure. Additionally, Appendix 2
contains the results given by recoding Inst_igo and converting IGOs as ―interventionist‖,
based on the definition by Boehmer et al (2004). The recoding for this variable was
necessary in order to test whether or not an IGO is seen as an interventionist in the
creation of institutional structure in an IGO.
Table 5 Institutional Structure as a Dependent Variable
Inst_igo
Avg-Dem
Membership

Coef.

Std. Err.

Z

.0373325
.0163468

.0111508
.0020647

3.35
7.92

N
Prob>Chi2
Note: Test are Two-tailed. Standard Errors are robust. P<.05

404
.0000

Table number 6 provides a list of all those IGOs that have any type of juridical
organs as well as have made used of it. The bolded IGOs are characterized by possessing
and used all of the juridical mechanisms applied for the purpose of this study such as
mediation and any type of a court or both. As the table shows, the majority of the IGOs
that posses and have used their juridical mechanisms are distinguished as being of
economic level type. Some of those organizations are Benelux Economic Union,
ECOWAS, and European Economic Community (EC) to name a few. Based on these
results, I conclude that besides the Permanent Court Arbitration organization, the
European Union and the United Nations, an economic mandate in an IGO combined with

37

institutional structure is important in order for that IGO to posses and use a juridical
organ.
Table 6 IGOs and Juridical Organs

IGO
ACCT
Andean Parliament
(AALCC)
ASEAN
Benelux Economic Union
CARICOM
Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine
COMESA
CEMAC
ECOWAS
ECSC
(EC)
EU
GCC
LAS
SDN
MIGA
NAM
NC
OIC
OAS
Permanent Court Arbitration
SADC
UEMOA
UN
WIPO
WTO
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Judiciary Mediation Juridical Used
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

Conclusion
The objective of this thesis has been to determine whether the number of
members, the level of democracy and institutional structure contribute to the creation and
use of juridical mechanisms in IGOs. The results here do not generally support most of
my hypotheses. I concluded that neither the number of memberships nor the average
level of democracy are direct factors in the decision of IGOs to create juridical
mechanisms or organs. These variables instead had an indirect effect on increasing the
level of institutional structure in IGOs, which in turn increases the chance that IGOs will
have a juridical structure. However, the results show that the level of institutional
structure in IGOs is strongly related to the possession of some form of juridical
mechanism, such as a court, a mediation mechanism, or both. This though is not
surprising given the nature of the original Boehmer et al (2004) data coding.
Moreover, the number of members in an IGO correlates highly with the
possession of formal mediation when there is no institutional structure involved in that
IGO. Despite the fact that the number of memberships was of higher significance than
the level of democracy in each of the tests, the results obtained were not as statistically
significant as had been expected at the outset of this thesis. Furthermore, it is necessary
to mention that the results that were found for the level of democracy in each of the
models reveal that democracy is neither relatively directly bonded with the creation, nor
with the use of a juridical organ in an IGO. The significance of the results on
membership demonstrates that there is a need of juridical organs in larger IGOs in order
to have a better conflict-resolution mechanism. Therefore, the necessity of juridical
mechanisms in IGOs is important in order to organize, implement and create new laws.
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The presence of a juridical mechanism tends to facilitate the resolutions of conflicts
between the members of IGOs and obtain better benefits for all of its members.
One of the possible answers to why the majority of the results were not that
strongly related to the possession and use of a juridical organ is that the sample size of
IGOs that have a juridical mechanism, a court, or mediation is relatively low, in turn
rendering the results insufficiently statistically significant. As a consequence, neither of
the independent variables was highly related to the use of any form of juridical
mechanisms, which means that IGOs might opt for other forms of conflict resolution
besides mediation or a court. On the other hand, the results yielded by adding the
institutional structure variable as a dependent variable make the results statistically
significant. These findings demonstrate that there appears to be a strong relationship
between the size of membership and democracy on the creation of an institutional
structure.
The reason I used Inst_igo as an independent and dependent variable was to
prove that the level of democracy and membership are important parts in the formation of
the institutional structure of an IGO. Without the Inst_igo variable most of the results
had not been statistically significant. Additionally, a higher level of institutional structure
in IGOs is highly related to the possession of any type of juridical mechanisms or organs,
but not for its use. Therefore, I can conclude at this time that the fact that an IGO
possesses a juridical mechanism cannot be linked to its use.
As already mentioned at the beginning of this study, there is a lack of literature on
this topic. Many scholars have focused their attention on IGOs such as the UN and
juridical organs such as the ICJ and leaving aside the relationship between other IGOs
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and juridical organs. Therefore, the exploration of why some IGOs have their juridical
mechanisms and others do not is necessary. Moreover, the lack of research on this topic
could be linked with the final results provided by the cross-sectional study. The study
relies on a sample where out of 295 IGOs only 23 IGOs possess some type of a court,
while only 19 of 294 have a mandate for formal mediation and 27 have a court or a
mandate for formal mediation or both. As a result, only 21 of those IGOs have used their
juridical mechanisms. As it is observed, the number of observations utilized in each of
the tables was very low, making the results to become not sufficiently statistically
significant. Furthermore, another characteristic that might have affected the results given
in this study could have been time. There is the possibility that a pooled time series of
IGOs for the collection of data could have yielded stronger results. However, this would
require more data collection. It is important to mention that all those IGOs that possess
and have used a juridical mechanism for this study are considered of economical type.
As a result, having a higher economical level between the members of an IGO could
determine on the use of any type of a juridical mechanism.
After all, the scope of this study was to detect the possible factors that contribute
to the creation and use of a juridical mechanism. Giving an answer to this question is
that, unfortunately, membership and democracy were not prevalent variables. The
importance of these variables also determined that the sample size selected for this thesis
caused the number of observations to decrease. This thesis also demonstrates that there
are other reasons besides membership, the level of democracy, and the level of
institutional structure that make IGOs create and use their own juridical mechanisms.
Perhaps, some of those states prefer to use those juridical organs already established by
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other institutions such as the ICJ or their members do not have the financial support and a
reliable social status to create a juridical organ. Furthermore, there is the possibility that
some conflicts are resolved bilaterally outside of IGOs.
Despite the lack of scholarly research on this topic, this study can be seen as
stimulation for other scholars to begin focusing more on various aspects concerning IGOs
and juridical organs. This study contributes by starting to fill in the knowledge about
what characteristics or factors, members of IGOs base their criteria in order to possess
and use a juridical mechanism inside of their institutions. The integration of new
variables, such as the average of economic level of development of an IGO and the level
of autocracy each IGO has, can also be studied as independent variables for future
studies. There is the probability that a higher wealth between the members of an IGO can
stimulate the creation and use of any type of juridical mechanism. Therefore, as the
interest to know the origins for the creation and use of juridical organs inside of an IGO
is expanding, the development of this type of analysis will eventually intensify.
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Appendix 1: IGO Institutional Structure Coding Explanation
The institutional structure (Inst_igo) variable was divided into four categories. For each
of them an indicator that combines the second, third and fourth categories have been
created. The first category was extracted from the data set created by Boehmer, Gastzke,
Hewitt and Nordstrom (2009). The last three categories were selected from the article Do
Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace? by Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, and Timoty
Nordstrom (2004).
No Institutional Structure (0)
It refers to the absence of institutionalization in an IGO. IGOs are scored as zero.
Minimal Structure (1)
This category is composed of two IGO types. First, some organizations exist almost
exclusively on paper. There is little evidence of any apparatus or organization. The
English Commonwealth (prior to 1965) or the Group of Ten fall into this category. These
organizations often give themselves a name and then the heads of state of member states
or other ministers meet on a regular basis, whether annually, biannually or otherwise.
For example, the Central African Customs and Economic Union seem to hold meetings
only of heads of states. These organizations lack any bureaucratic, executive, or judicial
organs that possess any formalized power.
Second, some IGOs contain minimal organizational structure, often committees or
councils where ministers or other representatives of member states meet and discuss
issues. There may be a few rules on procedures, such as voting, that are nonbinding or do
not compel states to take action. The ability to enforce agreements and the
implementation of decisions is optional for member states. The most centralized feature
in these organizations is often a secretariat or similar executive organ that generally
possesses few autonomous powers or functions beyond the logistics of organizational
meetings and communication. There are many examples of this type of organization,
among them, the Arctic Council and the Central American Common Market.
Structured IGOs (2)
Almost every organization appears on paper to possess several deliberative and
administrative organs, but most often the linkages between bodies are unguided by
codified procedures and little work is done beyond committees. At the intermediate
institutionalization level, however, member states relinquish minimal amounts of their
sovereignty to support IGO projects and missions. Organizational decisions are made by
formal voting, and/or other codified procedures guide member interactions.
Organizational operations (appointments and elections to positions) are also well
specified. Additionally, a bureaucracy often exists to carry out decisions—some of
which are binding on member states—and manage programs that produce concrete
benefits. In cases where there exists no extensive bureaucracy, other bodies or organs
assume concrete administrative powers over organizational programs without directly
relying on state decisions. For example, the secretariat of the Central European Initiative
makes some binding decisions. Of course, all member states have the ability to ignore
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IGO dictates, but most IGOs never attempt to directly influence state behavior in this
manner. Intermediate-level structural IGOs are scored as two.
Interventionist IGOs (3)
These IGOs possess clear mechanisms for coercing or influencing state behavior. This
can be realized in several ways. First, these IGOs include organizations with overt
security of conflict-resolution statements in their official missions that allow them to
inject themselves into interstate conflicts through established structures and mechanisms
of mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. These organizations typically also possess
many of the institutional characteristics regarding extensive codification of rules and
procedures between and within the executive, legislative, and judicial structures. Any
organization that possesses a judiciary structure is included in this category. The
European Union is one such example. Another example is the League of Arab States
(more commonly known as the Arab League). Second, some of these IGOs have the
ability to influence state behavior by directly manipulating the opportunity costs
associated with interstate conflict. IGOs may sanction states by withholding economic
benefits in the form of grants, loans, credits, or access to other resources. The World
Bank and IMF are high-profile examples. All IGOs in this category are scored a three.
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Appendix 2: Inst_igo Recoded Variable: Additional Results
The following table shows the results for the institutional structure variable recoded
based on the third category of institutional structure described above. The new variable
is called Interventionist. The variable determines whether or not IGOs intervene in the
creation of institutional structure through the level of democracy and membership. This
variable is classified as dichotomous and it equals 1 when an IGO is interventionist in the
creation of institutional structure and 0 otherwise. Comparing these results to those on
table number 5 demonstrate that democracy and membership continue being statistically
significant even when IGOs are used as an interventionist variable.
Table 7 Institutional Structure as Interventionist Dependent Variable
Interventionist
Avg-Dem
Membership

Coef.
.1234474
.0372951

Std. Err.
.0609666
.005501

Constant
-4.279505
.4732821
N
404
Prob>Chi2
.0000
Note: Test are Two-tailed. Standard Errors are robust. P<.05

48

Z
2.02
6.78
-9.04
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